Daniel M. Smargon, Audrey M. Viterbi v. Grand Lodge Partners, LLC, Jack Koson : Reply Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2011
Daniel M. Smargon, Audrey M. Viterbi v. Grand
Lodge Partners, LLC, Jack Koson : Reply Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
James S. Lowrie; Nathan D. Thomas; Jones Waldo Holbrook and McDonough, P.C.;.
Joseph E. Wrona; Todd D. Wakefield; Wrona Law Firm, P.C..
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Smargon and Viterbi v. Grand Lodge Partners, No. 20110059 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2011).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/2743
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Daniel M. Smargon and Audrey M. 
Viterbi, 
Plaintiffs and Appellees, 
v. 
Grand Lodge Partners, LLC and Jack 
Koson, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT GRAND 
LODGE PARTNERS, LLC. 
Appellate Case No. 20110059 
District Court Case No. 070500572 
Appeal from an order and final judgment of the Third Judicial District Court for Summit 
County, State of Utah, The Honorable Bruce C. Lubek and Keith A. Kelly Presiding 
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH, P.C. 
James S. Lowrie (#2007) 
Nathan D. Thomas (#11965) 
170 South Main Street, Suite 1500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
(801)521-3200 
WRONA LAW FIRM, P.C. 
Joseph E.Wrona (#8746) 
Todd D. Wakefield (#6354) 
1745 Sidewinder Dr. 
Park City, Utah 84060 - - s 
(435) 649-2525 ***jfcC0& 
SEP* U « * 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii 
INTRODUCTION 1 
ARGUMENTS 2 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT GLP REPUDIATED THE 
CONTRACT 2 
A. Trial Court Erred in Awarding Damages for Repudiation to the 
Smargons Because They Made it Clear that They Would Not 
Perform Their Obligation to Close; They Wanted Out of the 
Contract 3 
B. The Smargons' Claim that the Trial Court Found an Outright Breach 
of Contract on August 10, 2007 - As an Alternative to Repudiation -
Mischaracterizes the Ruling and Order 5 
i. The Smargons Never Asked the Trial Court to Make a 
Finding of Independent Breach, and The Trial Court Did Not 
Make Such a Finding 5 
ii. The Trial Court Could Not Have Made a Finding of Breach 
Because the Law and the Facts Would Not Have Supported 
It ....8 
C. The Requirements of the Doctrine of "Adequate Assurances" Were 
Raised at the Trial Court Sufficiently to Preserve Them for 
Appeal 9 
D. Finding Repudiation Where There Was No Request for Any 
Assurances Constituted Plain Error, And This Court Has Inherent 
Authority to Reverse Summary Judgment 12 
1. This Court Should Not Decline to Consider Plain Error in this 
Case Where Plain Error Was Not Raised in GLP's Opening 
Brief Because of a Reasonable Belief that the Issue Had Been 
Properly Preserved 12 
i 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2. The Trial Court Erred in Failing to Require or Determine that 
the Smargons Demanded (Or At Least Wanted) Adequate 
Assurances of Performance 15 
3. The Trial Court's Error in Finding Repudiation Was Obvious 
Where the Smargons Did Not Demand (Or Even Want) 
Adequate Assurances of Performance 16 
4. The Trial Court's Erroneous Finding of Repudiation, Without 
a Demand for Assurances Ever Having Been Made, Deprived 
GLP of the Reasonable Probability of a More Favorable 
Outcome 18 
II. UNDER THE CONTRACT, GLP WAS ENTITLED TO NOTICE AND A 
REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY TO CURE NOISE PROBLEMS VIA THE 
"PUNCH-LIST" PROCEDURE 18 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADOPTING THE SMARGONS' AFTER-
THE-FACT RE-INTERPRETATION OF GLP'S PROPOSALS, WHICH 
CONFLICTS WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THEY DEMONSTRATED AT 
THE TIME 21 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING RELIANCE DAMAGES 23 
CONCLUSION 23 
ii 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
UTAH CASES 
A.R. v. State, 2003 UT App 109, 2003 Utah App. LEXIS 429 13 
Am. Interstate Mortg. Corp. v. Edwards, 2002 UT App 16,41 P.3d 1142, 14,15 
B. T. Moran, Inc. v. First Sec. Corp., 24 P.2d 384, 387 (Utah 1933) 4 
Beachamv. Fritzi Realty Corp., 2006 UT App 35, 131 P.3d 271 13 
Bershires, LLC v. Sykes, 2005 UT App 536, P 21,127 P.3d 1243) 12 
Bitzes v. Sunset Oaks, Inc. 649 P.2d 66, 70 (Utah 1982) 10,15 
Boyle v. Christensen, 2009 UT App 241, 219, 810P.3d 58 13 
Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assocs., 752P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988) 19 
Century 21 All Western Real Estate & Investment Inc. v. Webb, 645 P.2d 52, 56 (Utah 
1982) 8 
Colemanv. Stevens, 2000UT 98, P9,17 P.3d 1122,1124) 13,14 
D.B. v. State, 2010 UT App 111,231 P.3d 819 13 
Davw v. Dav/s, 2011UT App 311, 2011 Utah App. LEXIS 314 13 
James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 802 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) 10 
Kasco Servs. Corp. v. Benson, 831 P.2d 86, 89 (Utah 1992) 7,9 
LeBaron & Assoc, v. Rebel Enters., 823 P.2d479,483 (Utah App. 1991) 10 
Moorev. Smith, 2007 UT App 101,158 P.3d 562 13 
Hi 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Nielsen v. Spencer, 2008 UT App 375, 196P.3d616, 621 12 
Polyglycoat Corp. v. Holcomb, 591 P.2d 449, 451 (Utah 1979) 22 
Reliance Ins. Co. v. UtahDept. ofTransp., 858 P.2d 1363, 1367 (Utah 1993)....23 
Romrellv. Zions First National Bank, 611 P.2d392, 395 (Utah 1980) 14 
Rugby Pub, LLC v. Dep't of Alcoholic Bev. Control, 2008 Utah App. LEXIS 396.13 
Statev. Bloomfield, 2003 UT App 3,63 P.3d 110 13 
State v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 688, 904 P.2d 688 13 
State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 361, 212 Utah Adv. Rep. 38 (Ut. App. 1993) 11 
State v. Gooch, 2000 UT App 374, 2000 Utah App. LEXIS 238 14,15 
State v. Hatch, 2000 UT App 24,2000 Utah App. LEXIS 257 13 
Statev. Hobbs, 2003 UT App 27, 64P.3dl218 13 
State v.Kassuhn, 2005 UT App 107, 2005 Utah App. LEXIS 123 13 
State v. Low, 2008 UT 58,141, 192P.3d867 16 
State v. Phathammavong, 860 P.2d 1001, 1003 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) 13 
State v. Schwenke, 2007 UT App 354,2007 Utah App. LEXIS 369 13 
Statev. Weaver, 2005 UT 49, 122 P.3d 566 13 
State v. Wright, 2003 UT App 435, 2003 Utah App. LEXIS 149 13 
Terrell v. McBride, 2006 UT App 191, 2006 Utah App. LEXIS 212 13 
Yorkv. Shulsen, 875 P.2d 590 (Utah App. 1994) 11 
iv 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
OTHER JURISDICTIONS 
Craigside, LLC v. GDC View, LLC, 2011 Fla. App. LEXIS 11440, 8 5 
STATUTES 
UTAH CODE ANN. §70A-2-609(l)(4) (Utah Uniform Commercial Code) 17 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts §254, §254(1) 17 
v 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INTRODUCTION 
Despite the years of litigation and boxes full of case files, underneath it all this 
dispute boils down to nothing more than a simple case of buyer's remorse. The plaintiffs, 
Daniel Smargon and Audrey Viterbi ("the Smargons"), decided to buy a new $1.5 million 
Deer Valley vacation condominium, and put down a $310,000 deposit with the 
developer, Grand Lodge Partners ("GLP"). When they finally visited the unit for their 
pre-closing inspection, they changed their minds. They decided that they did not want to 
close - under any circumstances. The Smargons did not care whether, when or how GLP 
eliminated the mechanical system noise they heard during the inspection (which GLP 
subsequently did). They wanted their money back. But, they also wanted a share of the 
profit they thought GLP would realize by re-selling the unit at a higher price (which 
never happened). GLP tried to refund all of their deposits, plus money the Smargons 
spent customizing and upgrading the unit. But, because the Smargons wanted an 
additional $300,000 of anticipated profit, they rejected GLP's offer and sued. 
Although the trial court denied their claim for profits, in order to return the 
Smargons' deposit and upgrade money, the trial court entered summary judgment for the 
Smargons on their contract claim and awarded them essentially what GLP had offered in 
the first place. Unfortunately, the litigation ended up costing both sides hundreds of 
thousands of dollars, and the trial court believed the contract required an award of 
1 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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approximately $3105000 in attorneys' fees - for a lawsuit that was unnecessary in the first 
place. 
This Court now has the opportunity to undo that unjust result. In looking for a 
legal basis upon which to return the Smargons' deposit and upgrade money, the trial 
court committed reversible error. It misinterpreted documents, and misapplied the law -
both of which are mistakes this Court can reverse. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT GLP REPUDIATED 
THE CONTRACT. 
The root of all of the trial court's rulings was its finding that GLP repudiated the 
contract by failing to provide adequate assurances of performance. However, as described 
in the Brief of Appellants, the trial court erred when it made that finding and its errors are 
properly before this Court. The Smargons' arguments to the contrary simply perpetuate 
the trial court's misunderstanding of the facts and misapplication of the law. 
Utah law provides that an obligee that reasonably fears non-performance has a 
right to demand "adequate assurances" of performance from the obligor, and may treat a 
failure to provide such assurances as a repudiation of the contract. However, in this case, 
the Smargons did not fear non-performance; they feared performance. The outcome 
they most wished to avoid was a successful closing. This Court should recognize the 
noise problem (which GLP was able to resolve completely) for what it became: a pretext 
for the Smargons' cold feet. This Court should reverse and vacate the summary judgment 
based on that pretext, and the resulting awards of damages and attorneys' fees, and 
remand this case to the trial court. 
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A. The Trial Court Erred in Awarding Damages for Repudiation to the 
Smargons Because They Made it Clear that They Would Not Perform 
Their Obligation to Close; They Wanted Out of the Contract. 
As set forth in GLP's opening brief, the Smargons never demanded any assurances 
from GLP. The reason for this failure is clear: they did not want assurances, they wanted 
out of the contract. The Smargons made it very clear that they would not give GLP the 
opportunity to address the noise issue and bring it down to an "acceptable" level.1 By 
doing so, they made it clear that they would not perform under any circumstances. 
Under section 254 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, "A party's duty to 
pay damages for total breach by repudiation is discharged if it appears after the breach 
that there would have been a total failure by the injured party to perform his return 
promise." Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 254(1). When the trial court ruled in this 
case that GLP repudiated the contract by failing to provide adequate assurances of 
performance, it ignored the fact that the Smargons would not have gone forward and 
closed regardless of GLP's actions. The trial court simply presumed that the Smargons 
wanted assurances, and wanted to close. But, the undisputed facts in the record do not 
support this conclusion. Rather, the facts in the record show that all the Smargons wanted 
after the inspection was to get out of their contract. 
Will Lange, the real estate agent representing both sides in the transaction, 
testified in his deposition that he spoke with Mr. Smargon following the inspection, who 
communicated to him that, "he wanted to extract himself from the purchase." (R. 
000776A-00076R, Ex. C at 25) (emphasis added). Mr. Lange's testimony continued: 
1
 It is undisputed that GLP subsequently did bring the noise levels down to at least industry 
standards. 
3 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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A. ... [T]hat subject occurred probably over a few conversations. I 
don't remember how many, but there were questions about could it be 
done, could he extract himself from the deal. And I recall suggesting to 
him that if they fixed the problem, the noise problem, what basis would he 
have for extracting himself from the deal?... 
Q. What did he [Mr. Smargon] say to that? 
A. His position was that he did not believe they could fix the problem 
and, therefore, that wasn't an option. 
A. ... Dan explained to me that since the developer was going to get the 
unit back, he felt that he was entitled to receive his full earnest money 
deposit back and he felt that he was entitled to, when the unit was 
remarketed and resold, to share in the profits that would be determined by 
the price that he had it under contract for, which I think was $1,595,000, as 
I recall, or $1,495, and whatever the owner ultimately sold it for. And he 
felt he should share in that differential as well as receiving his full earnest 
money deposit back, and he asked me if I thought that was fair. 
Q. What did you say? 
A. I said it was very unlikely the developer would agree to something 
like that. 
Q. Now, do you recall any other conversations with Dan or Audrey you 
haven't told us about? 
A. Well, it could have been in the context of the same conversation, but 
there was a discussion - there was a discussion on the contract itself. The 
contract, if the developer could fix the problems to comply with industry 
standards regarding noise, would he at that point have the basis to prevail in 
his not closing and would he have the basis for not forfeiting his earnest 
money... 
Q. So you queried whether he would have the basis and said that he 
should look at the facts and determine what's reasonable; is that right? 
A. That was discussed, whether -
Q. Well, what did he say on that point? 
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A. It seemed to me his opinion was that he took the position, as I recall, 
that he wasn't going to close and that he felt a fair solution to this whole 
issue was the one that I expressed a few minutes ago. 
Id. at 25-29 (emphasis added). That communication to a disclosed agent of GLP is 
deemed equivalent to a communication to GLP itself. B. T. Moran, Inc. v. First Sec. 
Corp., 24 P.2d 384, 387 (Utah 1933). Thus, the Smargons clearly advised GLP that they 
had no intention of closing, and that they wanted out of the contract. 
The fact that the Smargons simply lost interest in the unit is evident throughout the 
record. Nowhere in the record did they indicate after the inspection that they were willing 
to close. Even the Smargons' Complaint fails to allege that they were ready, willing and 
able to close. Thus, the trial court's Ruling and Order enabled the Smargons to employ a 
pretext - a temporary noise problem - to "extract themselves from the contract." This 
Court should not allow such conduct. 
Facing very similar facts, the Florida Court of Appeals correctly stated the law this 
way: "The holder of the duty based upon a condition precedent cannot profit from an 
anticipatory repudiation of a contract that he would have breached himself." Craigside, 
LLCv. GDC View, LLC, 2011 Fla. App. LEXIS 11440, 8. The testimony of Mr. Lange 
shows that the Smargons clearly communicated their intention not to close regardless of 
The allegation in the Smargons5 Statement of Facts that after their inspection "they then 
engaged in discussions with Grand Lodge regarding potential repairs" is very misleading on a 
very material point. Brief of Appellees at 14. The record citations provided do not reference any 
discussions concerning potential repairs. The Smargons' record citations point only to their 
rejections of GLP's proposals to cancel the contract without paying additional profit, and to Dan 
Smargon's inquiry whether he should retain an attorney. The only discussions in the record 
where the Smargons ever addressed the subject of potential repairs were those cited above in 
which they stated that GLP could not resolve their problems, and that they would not close. 
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GLP's actions from that point forward. The Smargons had no interest in receiving 
"adequate assurances." Consistent with section 254 of the Restatement, this Court should 
reverse the trial court's summary judgment penalizing GLP for failing to provide 
"adequate assurances" that were never requested, and were unwanted by the Smargons in 
any event. 
B. The Smargons5 Claim that the Trial Court Found an Outright Breach 
of Contract on August 10, 2007 - As an Alternative to Repudiation -
Mischaracterizes the Ruling and Order. 
In order to avoid what clearly is a problematic issue for them - i.e., their own 
failure to demand assurances - the Smargons claim that the trial court granted them 
summary judgment on an alternative basis: a finding that the condition of the unit alone 
during inspection constituted an outright breach. The problem with that argument is that 
the trial court never made such a finding. Indeed, it could not have made that finding 
under the facts and applicable law. 
i. The Smargons Never Asked the Trial Court to Make a Finding 
of Independent Breach, and The Trial Court Did Not Make 
Such a Finding. 
In support of their search for an alternative theory, the Smargons identify a quote 
from the Ruling and Order, take it out of context, and massage it into something the trial 
court never intended. The trial court simply did not make a finding of breach independent 
of repudiation, and the Smargons point to nothing in the Ruling and Order indicating that 
the trial Court intended to offer alternative theories of liability. No such support exists. 
Phrases such as "in the alternative," "even if that weren't the case," or "in addition" do 
not appear anywhere in the Ruling and Order. Id. Rather, the language of the Ruling and 
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Order indicates that the trial court found that the REPC remained executory following the 
inspection, and that repudiation was the basis for GLP's liability. Id. 
The trial court apparently did not think that the condition of the unit on the day of 
the inspection constituted an actionable breach. The trial court found fault only with the 
failure to provide assurances that GLP would solve a noise problem. In fact, 
notwithstanding the noise that day, the court stated that if only GLP had given "adequate 
assurances," then its "counterclaim for breach of contract and defenses against plaintiffs 
[sic] claims would have merit." (R. 000646). But, because it did not believe GLP had 
done so, the trial court held that "plaintiffs were entitled to treat defendants' failure to 
provide such assurances, within a reasonable amount of time, as a repudiation of the 
Contract." Id. The trial court never stated that GLP was in breach solely because of the 
condition of the unit during the Smargons' inspection. 
The very fact that the trial court addressed repudiation indicates that it did not 
consider there to be a breach at the time of the inspection. As the Smargons note in their 
brief, "[t]he question of repudiation is applicable only with respect to executory 
contracts." Brief of Appellees at 22 (citing Kasco Servs. Corp. v. Benson, 831 P.2d 86, 89 
(Utah 1992). The trial court did not need even to address the issue of repudiation unless 
the contract remained executory following the inspection. The fact that the trial court 
focused entirely on repudiation demonstrates that it considered the contract to remain 
executory. 
The trial court's singular attention to repudiation rather than breach makes sense 
because the Smargons did not even suggest that GLP was in breach by virtue of the noise 
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during the inspection in its Motion for Summary Judgment. (R.). The Smargons' 
arguments focused entirely on GLP's alleged repudiation of the contract. Id. 
In their brief, the Smargons repeatedly assert that GLP failed to "assign error to 
the district court's conclusion that Grand Lodge had breached its promise on August 10, 
2007." GLP would have assigned error if the trial court had granted summary judgment 
due to such a conclusion. However, the trial court did not do so. This Court should reject 
the Smargons' attempt to attribute an intention to the trial court that did not exist. The 
sole basis for the summary judgment was the trial court's finding of repudiation based on 
a failure of adequate assurances. 
ii. The Trial Court Could Not Have Made a Finding of Breach 
Because the Law and the Facts Would Not Have Supported It. 
Even if the trial court had made a finding that GLP breached, Utah law would not 
have supported this finding. For there to have been a breach of the REPC, the Smargons 
would be required to tender payment. Under well-established Utah law, "the party who 
desires to use legal process to exercise his legal remedies must make a tender of his own 
agreed performance in order to put the other party in default." Century 21 All Western 
Real Estate & Investment Inc. v. Webb, 645 P.2d 52, 56 (Utah 1982). The Smargons did 
not do so. 
Instead of tendering payment, the Smargons communicated their unequivocal 
unwillingness to close. GLP agreed to defer closing so the parties could work through the 
issues. Thus, the date for closing - and the time for GLP to deliver an "acceptable" unit -
was extended by mutual agreement. Under those circumstances, GLP could not have 
breached the contract on August 10, 2007, even if the unit was unacceptably noisy at that 
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time. As modified, the contract required GLP to deliver a unit with an "acceptable" noise 
level at a then indeterminate time in the future. But, before that time, the Smargons made 
it clear that they did not want the unit and would accept only a return of everything they 
had previously invested, plus an additional $300,000 in anticipated additional profit. (R. 
000930, Ex. C at 42:11-23; see also Ex, B and Ex, E). By doing so, the Smargons actually 
repudiated the contract. 
Because the Smargons did not tender their performance, an essential element of a 
claim for breach was missing. Additionally, the trial court concluded that the parties 
mutually extended the date for GLP to deliver the unit and the Smargons to tender 
payment to beyond August 10, 2007. As the Smargons admit in their brief, it was "[b]y 
agreement with Grand Lodge [that] the Smargons did not close on the unit on August 10, 
2005." Brief of Appellees at 14. GLP could not have been in breach of a contract on 
August 10, 2007 that the parties had mutually agreed to modify and extend their contract. 
In short, the Smargons' argument that the trial court found and ruled upon a 
breach by GLP on August 10, 2007 is a classic red herring. It is nothing more than a 
tactic to divert attention away from the issue of real significance: the Smargons' 
undisputed failure to demand assurances of performance. 
C. The Requirements of the Doctrine of "Adequate Assurances" Were 
Raised at the Trial Court Sufficiently to Preserve Them for Appeal. 
The Smargons contend that GLP failed to preserve the issue of "adequate 
assurances" for appeal. The Smargons are wrong. As illustrated above and in GLP's 
Brief of Appellant, the requirement that the Smargons demand assurances and their 
failure to do so were sufficiently before trial court and preserved for this appeal. For 
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example, in the Smargons' own Memorandum in Opposition to GLP's Motion for 
Summary Judgment (which was decided concurrently with the Smargons' motion), they 
acknowledged that they were only 'in a position to rightfully demand assurance that [the 
noise] problem would be rectified." (R. 000498). 
Moreover, the parties (as well as the trial court) cited and discussed Bitzes v. 
Sunset Oaks, Inc. 649 P.2d 66, 70 (Utah 1982) extensively. That case makes it clear that a 
demand must be made in order for assurances to be required. Id. ("The appellant had the 
right, under the circumstances of this case, to demand assurances before proceeding with 
his obligations under the contract. Appellant's letter of July 6, 1979 was such a demand 
for such assurances."). Rather than making such a demand for assurances (which the 
Smargons clearly did not want), GLP noted in its Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Reconsideration that all the Smargons had done was refuse to cooperate in the inspection 
and repair process, and refuse to close. (R. 001202, 001207). Consequently, the 
memorandum went on to explain, "GLP had no duty to provide any assurances..." Id. 
Even if the many references to the issue were "indirect" (and they were not), this 
Court has previously acknowledged that indirect references may be sufficient to preserve 
an issue for appeal. See, e.g. LeBaron & Assoc, v. Rebel Enters., 823 P.2d 479, 483 (Utah 
App. 1991) ("For an issue to be sufficiently raised, even if indirectly, it must at least be 
raised to a level of consciousness such that the trial judge can consider it." (quoting 
James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 802 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)). In this regard, this Court has 
noted that the key is accommodating "the trial court's need to assess allegations by 
isolating relevant facts and considering them in the context of the specific legal doctrine 
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placed at issue." State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 361, 212 Utah Adv. Rep. 38 (Ut. App. 
1993). That is why "[t]he 'mere mention' of an issue without introducing supporting 
evidence or relevant legal authority does not preserve that issue for appeal." State v. 
Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 361 (Utah App. 1993). 
As long as the issue is clearly before the court, and the relevant facts have been 
adequately developed, the issue is properly preserved. For example, in York v. Shulsen, 
875 P.2d 590 (Utah App. 1994), a habeas corpus petitioner argued that the habeas court 
erred in failing to determine whether he was competent when entering a guilty to plea to a 
manslaughter charge. Although there had been no direct request for such a determination 
below, this Court concluded that, "the issue of whether the plea-taking court should have 
made a competency inquiry before accepting petitioner's guilty plea was properly 
preserved for appeal." Id. at 594. The Court explained the holding by stating: 
Although all of the legal arguments developed on appeal may not have been 
articulated below, the underlying issue was clearly before the habeas court, 
as were the facts upon which petitioner now relies on appeal. This issue 
was sufficiently brought to the habeas court's attention through petitioner's 
second amended petition and the evidence contained in the record. 
Id. 
More relevant evidence and legal authority were before the trial court in this case 
than the court in York. With Bitzes cited, quoted and argued so extensively, the rule 
stating that the Smargons had the right "to demand assurances" was squarely before the 
trial court. Similarly, as detailed above and in GLP's opening brief the fact that the 
Smargons neither wanted nor demanded assurances was before the trial court with 
undisputed clarity. It should have been similarly clear to the trial court that the Smargons 
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were required to demand assurances if they wanted them, and that they did not do so 
because they did not want them. The record in this case shows far more than a "mere 
mention" of the issue. In sum, the Smargons' failure to demand assurances, as they were 
required to do, was adequately preserved. 
D. Finding Repudiation Where There Was No Request for Any 
Assurances Constituted Plain Error, And This Court Has Inherent 
Authority to Reverse Summary Judgment. 
As detailed in GLP's opening brief, the trial court erred in finding repudiation 
where the Smargons did not demand (or even want) assurances of performance. 
Regardless of whether this issue was preserved (and it was), Utah law allows this Court 
to reverse the trial court in a case of plain error. To establish plain error, GLP must show 
(1) that error exists, (2) that the error should have been obvious to the trial court, (3) and 
that the error harmed the appellant by depriving it of the reasonable probability of a more 
favorable outcome. Nielsen v. Spencer, 2008 UT App 375, 196 P.3d 616, 621 (citing 
Berkshires, LLC v. Sykes, 2005 UT App 536, P 21, 127 P.3d 1243) detailed. GLP has 
made such a showing. 
1. This Court Should Not Decline to Consider Plain Error in this 
Case Where Plain Error Was Not Raised in GLP's Opening 
Brief Because of a Reasonable Belief that the Issue Had Been 
Properly Preserved. 
Preliminarily, GLP acknowledges the existence of Utah cases stating that courts 
typically will not consider plain error if it is raised for the first time in a reply brief. See, 
e.g., The Berkshires, L.L.C. v. Sykes, 2005 UT App 536, 127 P.3d 1243, 1250. However, 
these cases do not apply here. 
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The reluctance of Utah courts to consider matters raised for the first time in a reply 
brief appeared first in State v. Phathammavong, 860 P.2d 1001, 1003 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993), and then expanded to encompass arguments of plain error in State v. Blubaugh, 
904 P.2d 688, 904 P.2d 688. Although several decisions followed the lead of Blubaugh, 
none of them involve an appellant who reasonably believed the underlying trial court 
error had been properly preserved and provided extensive supporting record citations. See 
Coleman v. Stevens, 2000 UT 98, 17 P.3d 1122, 1124; State v. Weaver, 2005 UT 49, 122 
P.3d 566; Davis v. Davis, 2011 UT App 311, 2011 Utah App. LEXIS 314; D.B. v. State, 
2010 UT App 111, 231 P.3d 819; Boyle v. Christensen, 2009 UT App 241, 219 P.3d 58 
aff d on other grounds Boyle v. Christensen, 2011 UT 20, 251 P.3d 810; Rugby Pub, LLC 
v. Dep't of Alcoholic Bev. Control, 2008 Utah App. LEXIS 396; State v. Schwenke, 2007 
UT App 354, 2007 Utah App. LEXIS 369; Moore v. Smith, 2007 UT App 101, 158 P.3d 
562; Terrell v. McBride, 2006 UT App 191, 2006 Utah App. LEXIS 212; Beacham v. 
FritziRealty Corp., 2006 UT App 35, 131 P.3d 271; State v. Kassuhn, 2005 UT App 107, 
2005 Utah App. LEXIS 123; State v. Wright, 2003 UT App 435, 2003 Utah App. LEXIS 
149; A.R. v. State, 2003 UT App 109, 2003 Utah App. LEXIS 429; State v. Hobbs, 2003 
UT App 27, 64 P.3d 1218; State v. Bloomfield, 2003 UT App 3, 63 P.3d 110; State v. 
Hatch, 2000 UT App 24, 2000 Utah App. LEXIS 257. However, GLP reasonably 
believed (and still maintains) the adequate assurances issue was properly preserved, and 
it identified substantial support in the record for that position. Declining to consider 
GLP's plain error argument now would invite appellees always to argue failure to 
preserve, regardless of supporting citations to the record, hoping for a potential "appellate 
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ambush" - i.e., a later finding of failure to preserve coupled with a denial of any 
opportunity for the appellant ever to raise plain error. 
Additionally, other controlling authority supports consideration of GLP's plain 
error argument. For example, Am. Interstate Mortg. Corp. v. Edwards, 2002 UT App 16, 
41 P.3d 1142, presented a case in which the appellant argued plain error for the first time 
in its reply brief. In that case, this Court stated the rule this way: "because [appellant] 
argued plain error . . . for the first time in [its] reply brief, we [could] decline to review 
[the issue].u Id. at 1148 (citing Coleman v. Stevens, 2000 UT 98, P9, 17 P.3d 1122, 1124) 
(emphasis added). However, this Court ultimately addressed the issue anyway, exercising 
its discretion in favor of considering a plain error argument despite the fact it was raised 
for the first time in the appellant's reply brief. 
Similarly, in State v. Gooch, 2000 UT App 374, 2000 Utah App. LEXIS 238, this 
Court noted that the appellant raised plain error for the first time in his reply brief. This 
Court first stated the general default position that "failure to argue plain error in his initial 
brief effectively waives the plain error argument." But in its next sentence, it stated, 
"Nevertheless, we address defendant's plain error argument." Id. Clearly, this Court 
possesses, and has exercised, inherent authority to address GLP's plain error argument. 
Doing so would be entirely consistent with the Utah Supreme Court's declaration that, on 
appeal, "the Court, in its discretion, may decide a case upon any points that its proper 
disposition may require, even if first raised in a reply brief." Romrell v. Zions First 
National Bank 611 P.2d 392, 395 (Utah 1980). 
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GLP's reasonable belief that the adequate assurances issue was preserved, and its 
argument of plain error now in response to the Smargons' contention that the issue was 
not preserved, makes this an appropriate case for this Court to follow the lead of Am. 
Interstate Mortg. Corp., Gooch and Romrell. Additionally, GLP's inclusion of its plain 
error argument in this reply brief is completely consistent with Rule 24(c) of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure because it is merely the natural response to a matter raised 
anew in the Smargons9 brief. For the foregoing reasons, this Court should consider GLP's 
plain error argument and reverse on that basis. 
2. The Trial Court Erred in Failing to Require or Determine that 
the Smargons Demanded (Or At Least Wanted) Adequate 
Assurances of Performance. 
The fact that the trial court erred in failing to recognize that that the Smargons 
never actually exercised their "right to demand adequate assurances" (Bitzes at 70) is 
briefed in detail in GLP's opening brief and will not be repeated exhaustively here. 
Suffice it to say that holding a GLP liable for failing to provide "adequate assurances" 
that were never even demanded sets up an ambush mechanism that is ripe for abuse. 
Finding liability where, as here, the obligee did not even want either assurances or 
performance, is even worse. It is an open invitation for parties to try to "extract 
themselves" from contracts by finding issues that might raise performance concerns 
which they can throw back at the other party after walking away. That is why this is not 
the law in Utah. As detailed above and in GLP's opening brief, Utah law provides that 
where one party to a contract has a reasonable basis to fear nonperformance by the other, 
it has the right to demand adequate assurances of performance before proceeding with its 
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obligations under the contract. Id. If the other party fails to respond to the demand with 
adequate assurances, that failure may be treated as repudiation of the contract. Id. In this 
case, the trial court's application of that doctrine treating the making of the demand for 
assurances as superfluous was error. 
3. The Trial Court's Error in Finding Repudiation Was Obvious 
Where the Smargons Did Not Demand (Or Even Want) 
Adequate Assurances of Performance. 
The second prong of the plain error inquiry requires that the trial court's error be 
"obvious." In this regard, the Utah Supreme Court has explained that "[a]n error is 
obvious when the law governing the error was clear at the time the alleged error was 
made." State v. Low, 2008 UT 58, % 41, 192 P.3d 867. In this case, the law was absolutely 
clear. First, it was clear in Bitzes, which held that "ftjhe appellant had the right, under 
the circumstances of this case, to demand assurances before proceeding with his 
obligations under the contract." Id. (emphasis added). Only after explaining that a 
fearful obligee may demand assurances does the Bitzes court then go on to explain that a 
subsequent failure to respond appropriately may be treated as a repudiation. 
That explanation is consistent with section 251 of the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts, which similarly states that "the obligee may demand adequate assurances of 
due performance." Restatement (Second) Contracts, §251 (emphasis added). Highlighted 
in Bitzes for the trial court to see, section 251 states: 
(1) Where reasonable grounds arise to believe that the obligor 
will commit a breach by non-performance that would of itself give the 
obligee a claim for damages for total breach under § 243, the obligee may 
demand adequate assurance of due performance and may, if reasonable, 
suspend any performance for which he has not already received the agreed 
exchange until he receives such assurance. 
16 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(2) The obligee may treat as a repudiation the obligor's failure to 
provide within a reasonable time such assurance of due performance as is 
adequate in the circumstances of the particular case. 
Id. 
Nearly identical language appears in the Utah Uniform Commercial Code. Utah 
Code Ann. § 70A-2-609(l). The only substantive difference is that the UCC finds the 
"demand for assurances" from the obligee to be so important that it requires the obligee 
to put it in writing to be effective. Id. The UCC then continues: 
"After receipt of a justified demand failure to provide within a reasonable 
time not exceeding thirty days such assurance of due performance as is 
adequate under the circumstances of the particular case is a repudiation of 
the contract. 
Id. at § 70A-2-609(4). 
Not only was the trial court's error "obvious" in the legal sense under Low, it was 
also obvious in the practical. The law could not be more clear: first comes demand, then 
come assurances or repudiation. Even if one had never seen Bitzes, the Restatement or 
the UCC, it would be an obvious invitation to trouble to impose an obligation of 
assurances, or possibly even find repudiation, without making a clear demand on the 
obligor first. Otherwise, obligees could escape contractual obligations by concocting 
stories of feared non-performance in courtrooms despite never giving the obligor a 
chance to provide assurances of performance, or performance itself. 
With the same rule appearing in so many places, with such clarity, and with such 
unworkable consequences for a failure to require a demand of assurances, the trial court's 
error in this case is "obvious" under any definition of that term. 
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4. The Trial Court's Erroneous Finding of Repudiation, Without a 
Demand for Assurances Ever Having Been Made, Deprived 
GLP of the Reasonable Probability of a More Favorable 
Outcome. 
There can be no question about the consequences for GLP of the trial court's error 
in this case. The entire case hinged on the trial court's finding of repudiation despite the 
fact that the Smargons never demanded, or even wanted, assurances of performance. But 
for the trial court's ruling on this issue, the outcome of the case almost certainly would 
have been different because the Smargons' desertion of the contract almost certainly 
would have constituted a breach. 
In this case all of the requirements for a finding of "plain error" are satisfied. This 
Court should call the trial court's decision on summary judgment what it was - plain 
error - and the judgment should be reversed. 
II. UNDER THE CONTRACT, GLP WAS ENTITLED TO NOTICE AND A 
REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY TO CURE NOISE PROBLEMS VIA THE 
"PUNCH-LIST" PROCEDURE. 
In addressing the Smargons' arguments about the meaning and scope of the 
"punch-list" procedure in the contract, GLP reiterates that it has not asked that this Court 
to enter summary judgment in its favor, but only to reverse the summary judgment for the 
Smargons. The matter should then be remanded to the trial court. Therefore, GLP will not 
address the Smargons' arguments concerning whether, when and how they breached the 
contract instead of GLP. 
Regarding the scope and intent of the repair work or "punch-list" provision in 
section 3.1 of the contract, the Smargons do not even address the contract's incorporation 
of "related improvements" in addition to the unit itself However, when interpreting a 
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contract, Utah law provides that "all of its terms should be given effect if it is possible to 
do so." Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assocs., 752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988). It is possible 
to give effect to the term "related improvements" by adopting the interpretation in GLP's 
opening brief, and finding that the mechanical systems radiating noise into the unit were 
necessarily subject to inspection and either acceptance or repair. 
Interpreting the contract as allowing the Smargons to require repairs to "related 
improvements" like mechanical systems makes even more sense when one considers that 
those systems were not simply a discreet, isolated entity emanating noise from across the 
hall. To the contrary, those systems were woven into the ceilings and walls of the unit 
itself. According to the plaintiffs' own descriptions, much of the noise they heard was not 
coming from the mechanical room, but from the ceiling of the unit. (R. 000543, Ex. K at 
35:5-7 and 23:24-24:3). 
Contrary to the Smargons' assertion, GLP's suggested interpretation of the 
contract would not "allow each and every buyer the opportunity to review each square 
inch of common area and offer differing opinions of what 'Repair Work' might be 
necessary." See Brief of Appellees at 37. The simple solution to that concern is for this 
Court to enforce the parties' intention to bring only the particular issue of mechanical 
system noise under the umbrella of the contract in this case. The Smargons were not 
concerned with "chimneys and crawl spaces," but rather with noise from mechanical 
systems. GLP was willing to accommodate that concern. So, the parties modified the 
contract accordingly. There is no harm in enabling purchasers, like the Smargons, with 
concerns about particular external features of a condominium project, to subject those 
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features to the same inspection and acceptance and acceptance procedures that apply to 
the interior of the unit. As this case illustrates, sometimes things outside of the unit itself 
can be as important as conditions inside. This Court should honor the desire of buyers, 
and the willingness of sellers, to provide for inspection and acceptance of features or 
amenities that buyers think are important. 
The Smargons' citation to the deposition testimony from Katy Mullin as support 
for their argument that noise issues were not within the scope of the contract offers 
nothing to the analysis. See Brief of Appellees at 37. Ms. Mullin was not opining about 
what was inside vs. outside the scope of the contract's repair work provisions. (R. 
000246-000247, Ex. J at 33). When not taken out of context, it is clear that she was 
merely recalling the fact that noise issues had not been an issue for any other Grand 
Lodge buyers. Id. It is puzzling why the Smargons would reference testimony that tends 
to establish that any noise issues were either very limited, or were resolved very quickly. 
At bottom, the contract provided a mechanism whereby the Smargons could assure 
themselves prior to closing that there were no problems, or that if there were they were 
identified for repair. In other words, the Smargons agreed that the mechanism in section 
3.1 of the contract would be used to determine whether the unit was as promised, and to 
ensure that GLP would fix any problems. One of the conditions that the Smargons said 
they were most concerned about was the potential for noise in the unit from nearby 
mechanical systems. Under the contract, the Smargons were entitled to identify the noise 
as a problem if it was not "acceptable," and even to have funds escrowed to ensure 
resolution of the problem. In other words, the Smargons had agreed to give GLP notice 
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and an opportunity to cure any deficiencies. Thus, GLP was contractually entitled to a 
reasonable opportunity to fix the noise problem. However, the Smargons refused to 
provide them that opportunity because they no longer wanted anything to do with Grand 
Lodge. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADOPTING THE SMARGONS' AFTER-
THE-FACT RE-INTERPRETATION OF GLP'S PROPOSALS, WHICH 
CONFLICTS WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THEY DEMONSTRATED 
AT THE TIME. 
The Smargons argue that the trial court correctly interpreted a series of letters 
from GLP as requiring the Smargons either to close or to accept less than what they were 
entitled to under the contract. Strangely, the Smargons begin their argument with a 
contention that the letters were unambiguous, requiring no parole evidence to interpret 
them. But it is beyond dispute that the trial court based its interpretation on parole 
evidence outside of the letters, namely the contract. The trial court's determination that 
the letters were unambiguous in its ruling excluding the affidavit of Paul Colton 
regarding his own intentions was undermined by the court's own subsequent reliance on 
the contract. The trial court looked openly to the contract to divine that when GLP said 
"option money" in its final letter it must actually have meant either "Earnest Money" or 
"Option Payment," but not both. It is noteworthy that the trial court never actually 
identified whether it was "Earnest Money" or "Option Payment" that GLP 
unambiguously meant to say. Of course, doing so would be very difficult where the term 
"option money" in the letters borrows exactly one word each from the two different types 
of deposits referenced in the contract. 
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Regarding the Smargons' complaint about the omission of the seven percent (7%) 
interest in GLP's letters, it is readily apparent that this modest amount of interest was 
somewhat of an afterthought. Even if GLP consciously intended to withhold that interest 
from the Smargons (which the evidence in the record does not support), it would not have 
constituted a material breach. According to Utah law, a party to a contract may sue for 
breach only "where there has been a material breach of the contract by the other party." 
Polyglycoat Corp, v. Holcomb, 591 P.2d 449, 451 (Utah 1979). 
What constitutes so serious a breach as to justify rescission is not easily reduced to 
precise statement, but certainly a failure of performance which 'defeats the very 
object of the contract' or '[is] of such prime importance that the contract would 
not have been made if default in that particular had been contemplated' is a 
material failure. 
Id. In the context of their purchase of a nearly $1.5 million ski condominium in Deer 
Valley, the Smargons do not even contend that omission of the seven (7%) interest 
accruing on one half of their deposit "defeats the very object of the contract," nor could 
they with a straight face. 
Similarly, the Smargons contend that GLP affirmatively took the position that they 
were not entitled to any interest. The statement referenced in GLP's letter was not 
intended to suggest that the Smargons were entitled to no interest, but instead that the 
rate of interest upon which they insisted was far beyond that provided for in the contract. 
The Smargons were not satisfied with only seven percent (7%) on their money because, 
as professional investors, they are accustomed to much higher rates of return. 
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In short, the trial court erred in excluding GLP's proffered parole evidence while 
relying on other parole evidence in the form of the contract, and its resulting 
interpretation of GLP's offer letters was not supported by evidence or applicable law. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING RELIANCE DAMAGES. 
In their argument that money spent on customizing and upgrading the unit should 
not be subject to the contract's liquidated damages provision, the Smargons claim that 
those expenditures were not "incapable or very difficult of accurate estimation." Reliance 
Ins. Co. v. Utah Dept. of Tramp., 858 P.2d 1363, 1367 (Utah 1993). The Smargons 
appear to confuse the process of totaling up those damages after the fact with the task of 
estimating them at the time of the contract. Certainly, it was a simple matter to determine 
accurately what those expenditures totaled at trial. But there was no showing at trial or 
elsewhere in the record that anyone knew or could have known at the time of contracting 
what the Smargons might decide to do during the lengthy construction process. Indeed, at 
the time of contracting, it would have been nearly impossible to guess what the Smargons 
might do, or what it might cost. Therefore, the liquidated damages provision was an 
appropriate substitute, and should have been enforced even with respect to the Smargons' 
changes to the unit. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, this Court should reverse the trial court's entry of 
summary judgment for the Smargons, and the resulting awards of damages and attorneys' 
fees, and remand this matter. 
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